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THE FRAME OF REFERENCE AND OTHER
PROBLEMS
Richard D. Friedman *
Jeffrey L. Fisher **
Given the pair of Fishers, we’ll use first names. And because we have
1
more to say about George’s essay, we’ll concentrate our attention there.
I. History
George argues that, centuries ago, jurists did not distinguish between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, and so the distinction cannot be a
historically well-grounded basis for modern confrontation doctrine. The
argument proceeds from an inaccurate frame of reference.
When the confrontation right developed, principally in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and English defendants—Raleigh among them—
demanded that adverse witnesses be brought face to face with them, they
were making a procedural assertion as to how witnesses must give their
testimony. (Giving testimony is what witnesses in litigation do.) Rarely did
they phrase this claim in terms of hearsay, for the simple reason that there
was no rule against hearsay in the modern sense. Similarly, numerous
statutes protected the right of treason defendants to have witnesses brought
face to face, and these statutes never mentioned hearsay.
True, Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise from the early eighteenth century said
that “a mere hearsay is no Evidence,” but that was a limp statement: neither
2
he nor any other writer at the time elaborated on it. (Contrast the dense
discussion of the law governing witnesses.) They did not offer a definition of
hearsay, without which an exclusionary rule is indeterminate, nor did they
catalogue exceptions, without which such a rule would be impractically

*
Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
** Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
1. We certainly agree with Deborah that it is important to recognize the public
implications of domestic violence. We do not regard the holding in Hammon v. Indiana as
violating this principle. There, the suspect was known and in the presence of the police; it was
clear that there was no imminent danger to anybody.
2. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99 (Garland Publ’g 1979) (1754).
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broad. The fact is that lots of hearsay was admitted in the early- and mid3
eighteenth century, in criminal as well as civil cases.
George certainly agrees that not all hearsay should be excluded. But the
point appears to have escaped John Marshall; Marshall’s broad-brush 1807
condemnation of all hearsay (and exclusion of a conspirator’s statement)
proves far too much and offers no support for George. Marshall’s statement
does suggest that by then—thirty years after the early state constitutions
articulated the confrontation right, some using the “face-to-face” formula—
4
lawyerly recognition of, and broad opposition to, hearsay had taken hold.
Over succeeding decades, the wide scope of the hearsay rule tended to make
it, rather than the confrontation right, the doctrinal focus, even as the rule
was whittled and shaped by exceptions that made its scope more practical
but obscured its rationale.
As for George’s argument based on the statement by the Portuguese
gentleman in Raleigh’s case, Rich responded to this precise argument earlier
5
in the year, so given word limitations we will offer only a citation here.
And as for dying declarations: When the doctrine emerged, it was not
conceived as an exception to the rule against hearsay, which was still in
embryonic form. Rather, the stated rationale was that imminent death was as
powerful a sanction as the oath—in other words, that a surrogate for the
ordinary required conditions of testimony was present. (Rich has argued
6
repeatedly that forfeiture provides a better rationale. ) Even as the hearsay
rule began to gel, a leading case described dying declarations as an
alternative (along with formal statements to a justice of the peace taken
under statutory directive) to the ordinary way of giving evidence—live
7
testimony subject to oath and confrontation in open court.
II. Standards
Like George, we have been disappointed by the Supreme Court’s failure
thus far to articulate a fully developed conception of what is “testimonial.”

3. E.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 234–35
(2003); T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999); John H.
Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189–90 (1996).
4. See Gallanis, supra note 3, at 503 (“[T]he 1780s were a period of considerable
activity and . . . by 1800 much of the modern approach to hearsay was already in place.”).
5. Richard D. Friedman, The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 433,
459–62 (2014).
6. E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 733 (2009).
7. King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789).
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But the problem is fixable—it is not the fault of the underlying approach—
because such a conception is available.
We agree that it is confusing to speak of an actor’s primary purpose
“objectively considered.” Purpose is a subjective matter. But this aspect of
the problem would disappear if the Court spoke, as we believe it should, in
terms of reasonable anticipation—rather than purpose—of prosecutorial use.
Whose anticipation? Again, we agree that the Court has muddied the
waters. Justice Scalia is right: it is the anticipation of the declarant, the
8
purported witness, that should be decisive. We believe that this is not
inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncements that the perspective of the
questioner, if there is one, should be taken into account: what the declarant
understands the purpose of the questioner to be may serve as a key factor in
determining likely use of the statement. (And there is nothing perverse, by
the way, about the fact that a prosecutor might create evidence without being
subject to the Confrontation Clause; evidence creation alone is not sufficient
to invoke the clause, which is indisputably about witnessing.)
III. Reliability
George contends that the best rationale for Crawford is that “declarants
who speak in anticipation of trial have reason to lie, rendering their
statements unreliable,” but his argument misses the mark. Crawford, while
recognizing that the Confrontation Clause creates “a procedural rather than
a substantive guarantee,” spoke of its “ultimate goal” as being “to ensure
reliability of evidence.” That’s not quite right. Eyewitness testimony is
notoriously unreliable, and confrontation cannot ensure reliability; when two
witnesses give conflicting evidence, both cannot be reliable. The most we can
hope for is that confrontation will help the trier of fact make accurate
findings out of an assemblage of evidence, much of which may be very
unreliable. But whether or not that is true, the real purpose of the clause is to
ensure that witnesses perform their function under historically prescribed
conditions (that is, face to face, under oath, subject to cross-examination,
and, if reasonably possible, in open court). When a witness testifies at trial, a
judge does not say, “That was so reliable that no cross is necessary.” There’s
no reason for a different result when a witness has testified out of court, with
the expectation that the testimony will be used for criminal investigation and
prosecution.

8. We will not discuss here whether the ordinarily applicable approach should be
adjusted, or replaced altogether, when the speaker is a child or a person with developmental
deficiencies.
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IV. ROBERTS Redux?
In the end, George’s proposed solution is essentially an attempt to create
an ideal hearsay code and give it constitutional force. While creating such a
hearsay code is a worthwhile project, we respectfully suggest that it has
nothing to do with the confrontation right. At any rate, there is no reason to
believe a second attempt at turning the confrontation right into a catalogue
of supposedly reliable classes of evidence, backed up by case-specific
assessment, would be any more successful than the first. Can we really say
that custodial confessions are inherently unreliable? Even a confession
9
acknowledging responsibility for a murder, as in Lee v. Illinois? Someone
nostalgic for a return to the era in which the Court transformed the
confrontation right into an attempted sifter of good and bad evidence might
take pause from the fact that, decades into the Roberts regime, lower courts
10
mangled cases like Lee, Lilly v. Virginia, and Crawford. In each of these
instances, the lower courts held admissible against the accused a statement
made out of court to the authorities by another person—even though for
more than three centuries it had been obvious that one could not act as a
11
valid witness against another by making a custodial confession.
It is true, though unfortunate, that four justices think that the scientific
underpinnings of forensic lab reports, at least in part, make such reports
nontestimonial. But no member of the present Court has stated that he or
she wishes to return to the Roberts regime. Small wonder; it yielded a
doctrine without historical or textual basis, one that gave inadequate
guidance to the lower courts and failed to provide clear protection in core
cases.
The testimonial approach expresses a sound conception of the
confrontation right. It has not yet developed as fully as it should. But the
missteps that George identifies and some resulting opacity in the doctrine
need not constrain the future.

9.
10.
11.

476 U.S. 530 (1986).
527 U.S. 116 (1999).
Tong’s Case, Kel. J. 17, 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (K.B. 1662).

